

Preventing UDP Flooding Amplification Attacks with Weak Authentication

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Denial of Service attacks on the Internet

- **Internet-connected servers have finite ability to process incoming traffic**
- **an attacker can prevent a server from processing useful incoming traffic by sending it lots of useless traffic**
- **this is a Denial of Service (DoS) attack**
 - also known as a **Flooding** attack

DoS with spoofed source IP

- **if the DoS traffic comes from a single source IP, the server administrator can block all traffic from that IP**
- **but the attacker can send data with spoofed source IP addresses**
 - the administrator cannot block all these addresses
 - many ISPs don't check source IP addresses

Flooding Amplification attacks

- **Some Internet services respond to one packet with many packets**
- **e.g. the old telephone tree: you call 10 people, each of which calls 10 people, etc.**
 - AllNet works in this way
- **if such an amplifier receives a packet from a spoofed IP address, it replies to that address**
 - with more data than it received
- **the attacker sends the target's IP address as the source IP!!**
 - the amplifier replies by sending data to the target

Flooding Amplification attack details

- **The attacker selects a set of amplifying servers**
 - server could be DNS, NTP, or other
 - only UDP, because TCP 3-way handshake does not complete for spoofed IP source addresses
- **Packets sent to these servers elicit a reply to the target**
 - the DoS comes from these “innocent” third-party servers
- **works even without amplification**
 - but attacker needs more bandwidth than target
- **works better with amplification!**

Outline

1. Denial of Service attacks ✓

2. Flooding Amplification attacks ✓

Successful Flooding Amplification attacks in 2013 and 2014

3. Prevention

4. Weak Authentication

- Stateless Weak Authentication
- AllNet

5. Evaluation

2013/2014 UDP Flooding Amplification attacks

- **2013 attack targeted spamhaus**
 - DNS servers used as amplifiers
- **2013/4 attack targeted cloudflare**
 - NTP servers used as amplifiers
- **the targets had now direct way of identifying the attackers**

Preventing Flooding Amplification

Two necessary ingredients for a successful attack:

- spoofed source IP address
- traffic amplification

1. Convince ISPs to filter out spoofed source addresses

- too much work for ISPs, many do not filter



2. Make servers not amplify traffic

- must be done for each type of UDP server

Weak Authentication

- **Authentication: evidence of who you are**
- **Weak Authentication: evidence that you can receive traffic at a specific IP address**
 - e.g. in the TCP 3-way handshake, the answer to the second packet provides the server with evidence that the client received the second packet

Weak Authentication Examples



Cookies for Weak Authentication

- **If Alice sends a bit string s to IP x**
- **and in return, receives s from x**
- **then Alice has evidence that IP x is participating in the protocol**
- **refinement: s is a combination (hash) of an unpredictable value with x itself**
 - then Alice can verify any returned x without having to store the pair (s, x) – stateless authentication!
- **TCP cookies combine IP and seq number**

AllNet

- **designed to work well on the Internet**
 - UDP and TCP
- **when there is no Internet, designed to work on ad-hoc networks**
- **sending to anyone who might need the message**
 - many redundant message transmissions
- **amplification!!**

Weak Authentication for AllNet

- **a UDP packet from an unknown IP elicits a small response with secret s**
 - s is a cookie based on the IP address (IPv4 or IPv6)
 - the address is hashed with a local secret
- **if a response carries s , the IP is added to the list of destinations for UDP traffic**
- **in practice, AllNet on UDP regularly sends keepalive/heartbeat messages, and these can carry s**
- **s (i.e. the local secret) can change over time**

Evaluation

- **When strict authentication is turned on for AllNet:**
 - failing to respond to an authenticating keepalive keeps us from receiving any traffic
 - sending many packets to an AllNet, without responding, only receives an authenticating response once every 10s
- **When responding correctly, traffic is carried as usual**
- **Weak authentication adds one round-trip time to the exchange**

Integration

- **first, distribute code that responds to the weak authentication**
- **later, can deploy code that only amplifies after weak authentication**
- **because AllNet forwards packets widely, some of the forwarders can be strict, and others not, and we still have connectivity while accomodating older code**
- **once all have upgraded, can be strict**

Summary

- **Weak Authentication only guarantees that the sender can see what we sent to them**
- **Weak Authentication efficiently discards packets from spoofed IPs**
- **Weak Authentication prevents Denial of Service Amplification attacks with spoofed source IPs**

Denial of Service attacks and TCP

- **TCP is particularly vulnerable to DOS:**
 - TCP SYN packets make the server allocate memory
 - if a packet in a connection is dropped, TCP intentionally slows down to avoid causing congestion
 - if many packets are dropped, TCP slows down to one packet/RTT
- **On the other hand, spoofed source Ips cannot succeed with the TCP 3-way handshake**